UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-6-2016

State v. Andersen Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43889

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Andersen Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43889" (2016). Not Reported. 3072.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3072

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
No. 43889
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
Ada Co. Case No.
vs.
)
CR-2014-14108
)
RICHARD ERNEST ANDERSEN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE PATRICK H. OWEN
District Judge
________________________

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 334-2712

JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 4
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5
Anderson Has Failed To Show That The District Court
Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Him To Pay $50,705.91
In Restitution ........................................................................................ 5
A.

Introduction ................................................................................ 5

B.

Standard Of Review ................................................................... 5

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By
Ordering Andersen To Pay $50,705.91 In Restitution ................ 5

CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................... 9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 768 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1989) ......................... 7, 8
State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 93 P.3d 708 (Ct. App. 2004)................................. 6
State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 169 P.3d 275 (Ct. App. 2007) .............................. 5
State v. Taie, 138 Idaho 878, 71 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2003) .................................. 6
STATUTES
I.C. § 19-5304(2) .................................................................................................. 5
I.C. § 19-5304(3) .................................................................................................. 6
I.C. § 19-5304(7) .......................................................................................... 5, 6, 8
I.C. § 19-5305 ....................................................................................................... 7

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Ernest Andersen appeals from the restitution order associated
with his convictions for battery on a police officer, malicious injury to property
(misdemeanor), and battery (misdemeanor).

.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the Presentence Report (“PSI”), the facts underlying
Andersen’s convictions are as follows:
The attached police report indicates that on September 23, 2014,
police responded to a fight situation. Dispatch advised that Robert
Smith had walked up to some neighoring [sic] occupants to ask
them to keep the noise down. When he did, a male spit on him.
While in route, it was advised that Richard Andersen was out of
control and acting strange. Upon arrival, Richard Andersen was in
the driveway. He had obviously urinated himself, as his crotch area
was wet. He also had blood all over his mouth. Mr. Andersen was
jumping up and down as officers ordered him to sit down. Mr.
Andersen then starting aggressing Corporal Markle. Officer
Cromwell approached Mr. Andersen and grabbed his left arm. Mr.
Andersen attempted to pull away. Officer Cromwell then used a
[sic] arm-bar takedown technique in order to take him to the
ground.
Once on the ground, Mr. Andersen kicked Officer
Cromwell on two (2) occasions. As a result, Officer Cromwell
delivered knee strikes to Mr. Andersen's thigh area in attempt to
stop him. Mr. Andersen's left wrist was placed in handcuffs, while
keeping his right arm underneath him. He was ordered to place his
right arm behind his back, but refused and began kicking around
and moving around on the ground. Concerned that he might have
a weapon, Officer Cromwell delivered several more knee strikes to
his thigh. Mr. Andersen then complied and was able to be placed
in handcuffs. After doing this, Mr. Andersen was able to move to
his side and kick Officer Cromwell in the left leg.
Upon speaking with Devian Stapleton and Victor Kennedy, Mr.
Stapleton advised that he lived at the address and had several
people over. He advised that he had never met Mr. Andersen
before. Mr. Andersen showed up at his house and informed
everyone that he had just taken Acid. Mr. Andersen then
1

proceeded to break items in Mr. Stapleton's kitchen, to include
several dishes and glasses, as well as throwing items on the floor.
Mr. Stapleton then began fighting with Mr. Andersen, stating this
was how Mr. Andersen got the bloody lip. Mr. Andersen then spit
blood on Mr. Stapleton. Mr. Stapleton said that his neighbor,
Robert Smith, came over. When he did, Mr. Andersen spit blood in
Mr. Smith's face.
(PSI, p.3.)
The state charged Andersen with battery on a police officer, malicious
injury to property (misdemeanor), and two counts of misdemeanor battery. (R.,
pp.116-123.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Andersen pled guilty to all but one
count of misdemeanor battery.

(R., p.103.)

The district court sentenced

Andersen to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, for battery on a
police officer, all suspended, and placed him on probation for five years. (R.,
pp.116-123.) The court sentenced Andersen to 17 days of jail on each of the two
misdemeanors. (Id.)
The state filed a Motion for Restitution, requesting $53,715.51 for losses
incurred by the City of Boise and $70.70 to the Boise City Police Department.
(R., pp.124-132.) At the restitution hearing, the only witness was Jason Carrier,
a senior claims adjuster for Intermountain Claims, “a third-party administrator for
the City of Boise for the workers’ compensation as a self-insured employer under
the state of Idaho.”

(Tr., p.2, Ls.10-23.) During the hearing, the court admitted

State’s Exhibit 1, an itemization verified by Mr. Carrier as consisting of “all of the
documentation and all the reimbursements that were actually made by the
insurance company and/or the City of Boise to providers.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-10.)
After Mr. Carrier testified, the state requested the court order restitution in the

2

amount set forth in State’s Exhibit 1, which reduced the amount of restitution to
$50,705.91. (Tr., p.56, Ls.16-21; St. Ex. 1, p.3.) Andersen’s counsel argued that
Andersen should not be ordered to pay such a high amount of restitution
because he was unlikely to have the ability to pay it due to his lack of education
and work experience, explaining, “[h]e will be financially ruined by this.” (Tr.,
p.61, L.2 – p.62, L.12.)
After taking the matter under advisement (Tr., p.66, Ls.19-20), the district
court issued a “Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Restitution” (R., pp.142150), and “Order for Restitution and Judgment” (R., pp.151-152), ordering
Andersen to pay $50,705.91 in restitution, while “fully aware it is unlikely that
Andersen will ever pay the restitution in full” (R., p.149). Andersen filed a timely
notice of appeal from the district court’s restitution order. (R., pp.153-155.)

3

ISSUE

Andersen states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it ordered Mr. Andersen to pay
$50,705.91 in restitution to the Boise City Attorney’s Office for
Officer Cromwell’s injury?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Andersen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
ordering him to pay $50,705.91 in restitution?

4

ARGUMENT
Anderson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Ordering Him To Pay $50,705.91 In Restitution
A.

Introduction
Andersen contends that the district court abused its discretion under I.C. §

19-5304(7) 1 by ordering him to pay $50,705.91 in restitution despite his current
and future earning ability. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-11.) The record however,
reflects that, pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(7), the district court properly considered
Andersen’s current and future earning ability and exercised sound discretion in
determining the amount of restitution.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution is committed to the trial court's

discretion, and the trial court’s factual findings in relation to restitution will not be
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687,
692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Ordering Andersen To
Pay $50,705.91 In Restitution
Idaho’s restitution statute provides that the sentencing court “shall” order

restitution for economic loss actually suffered by the victim. I.C. § 19-5304(2).
1

I.C. § 19-5304(7) reads:

The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of
such restitution, shall consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the
victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning
ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate.
The immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of
itself, a reason to not order restitution.
5

Nevertheless, the court may decline to order restitution or order less than full
restitution after considering other factors, including “the financial resources,
needs, and earning ability of the defendant.” I.C. § 19-5304(3), (7). While a
district court is required to consider these factors, inability to pay neither
precludes nor limits a restitution award; rather, ability to pay is only one factor for
a court’s consideration when it makes a discretionary restitution determination.
State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State
v. Taie, 138 Idaho 878, 880, 71 P.3d 477, 479 (Ct. App. 2003)). In addition,
“[t]he immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of
itself, a reason to not order restitution.” I.C. § 19-5304(7).
Andersen does not argue that the district court failed to consider his ability
to pay restitution, nor does he highlight any part of the record that would indicate
as much. 2

Instead, he disagrees with the district court’s decision after

considering his ability to pay. Specifically, Andersen contends the court abused
its discretion in ordering restitution because he has shown a current and future
inability to pay restitution based on the following factors gleaned from the
Presentence Report: (1) he is a 21-year-old high school drop-out who does not
2

Even if Andersen is contending the district court failed to consider his ability to
pay, his argument fails. In Olpin, 140 Idaho at 379-380, 93 P.3d at 710-711, the
defendant challenged a restitution order where, at the restitution hearing, the
district court did not specifically state that it had considered the defendant’s
ability to pay. Olpin, 140 Idaho at 379-380, 93 P.3d at 710-711. This ability was
referenced only in Olpin’s PSI. Id. at 380. Nonetheless, the Idaho Court of
Appeals said it was not convinced that the district court failed to adequately
consider Olpin’s ability to pay restitution, and the restitution order was affirmed.
Id.
Here, unlike in Olpin, the district court expressly recognized the
requirements of I.C. § 19-5304(7), including Andersen’s ability to pay. (R., p.149;
Tr., p.56, L.25 – p.57, L.1; p.60, Ls.6-11; p.61, Ls.13-16.)
6

have a GED, and who had to have an Individual Education Plan in school
because he was “slow,” (2) he has had only one job in his life, and that lasted
seven days, and (3) he lives in his parent’s home with his girlfriend and their (he
and his girlfriend’s) young daughter.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-8.)

Anderson

concludes, “It is all but impossible for someone in [his] position to obtain the
education level and earning capacity needed to pay over $50,000 in restitution.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.) Andersen’s argument fails.
In State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 768 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1989), Bybee
was convicted of grand theft, and was ultimately ordered to pay over 1.5 million
dollars in restitution. Bybee, 115 Idaho at 542, 768 P.2d at 805. Bybee argued
that the amount was excessive given his incarceration, age, financial needs and
inability to pay. Id. at 543.

The Idaho Court of Appeals, however, found no

abuse of discretion:
Given the magnitude of the amounts involved here, we
believe it unlikely that Bybee will ever meet the full amount of
restitution ordered. But, in the event Bybee is able to obtain some
assets, the victims should have ready access to the assets for
satisfaction of their losses. The order of restitution will provide the
essential avenue of relief to the victims. The order may be
recorded as a judgment and the victims may execute as provided
by law for civil judgments. I.C. § 19-5305.
If the order required Bybee to make installment payments or
if had set a deadline for paying restitution, we would be inclined to
vacate the order. As it now stands, however, the order simply gives
the victims the present ability to obtain a judgment. We see nothing
wrong with that.
Id.
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Here, similar to the situation in Bybee, and in obvious reference to I.C. §
19-5304(7), the district court realized it was unlikely that the full amount of
restitution would ever be paid, explaining:
As an exercise of discretion, the Court does not determine an order
of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable. For that
reason, the Court will order restitution as requested. In so doing,
the Court is fully aware it is unlikely that Andersen will ever pay the
restitution in full. At the same time, the Court also considered and
hopes that Andersen’s future ability to pay may improve.
(R., p.149.) Although the district court did not expressly state that its restitution
order would do so, as in Bybee, the order gave “the victims the present ability to
obtain a judgment.” See Bybee, 115 Idaho at 543, 768 P.2d at 806. 3
Andersen, like Bybee, may never have the financial ability to fully repay
the victims for his crimes. That fact, standing alone, does not show an abuse of
discretion. Further, he could potentially obtain money by inheritance or gifts from
friends and relatives. The victims of Andersen’s crimes should have access to
any assets that Andersen might come across.

The fact that the Andersen

disagrees with the district court’s decision does not amount to an abuse of
discretion.

3

As was true in Bybee, the district court here did not order a payment deadline
or installment payments on the restitution amount. See Bybee, 115 Idaho at 543,
768 P.2d at 806.
8

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order of restitution.
DATED this 6th day of September, 2016.

/s/ John C. McKinney_______________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
JCM/vr

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of September, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender’s basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk’s office.
/s/ John C. McKinney______________
John C. McKinney
Deputy Attorney General
JCM/vr
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